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An Offer They Couldn't Refuse: Rolling Back RICO Through
a Direct Interpretation of Hobbs Act Extortion
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") in 1970 with the goal of eliminating
organized crime.1 Despite this goal, recent years have seen civil
RICO expanded beyond its originally intended sphere.2 Securities
fraud, commercial fraud, and antitrust claims, rather than traditional
organized crime, have increasingly been the basis for civil RICO
actions.' In addition,
plaintiffs have attempted to apply RICO in the
"protest" context.4 Such civil actions frequently target abortion
protesters,5 and the general applicability of RICO indicates plaintiffs
may soon target other protesters, such as environmental, animal
rights, or anti-war activists.6
Two factors have driven this expansion of civil RICO: the
expanding definitions of terms within RICO and the expanding
breadth of its predicate offenses.7 As an example, plaintiffs rarely
have difficulty meeting the enterprise requirement of RICO, which
defines the sorts of organizations to which RICO applies, 8 because
the courts have interpreted the requirement broadly.9 Civil RICO
actions against protesters commonly cite the extortion provision of
the Hobbs Act,1" § 1951(b)(2), as the requisite predicate offense.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1967 (2000)); Alexander M. Parker,
Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819, 819 (1996).

2. Parker, lupra note 1, at 819-20. RICO creates civil and criminal liability. 18
U.S.C. § 1964 (2000) (establishing the civil remedies of RICO).
3. Parker, supra note 1, at 819.

4. Id. at 820.
5. E.g., Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 398 (2003) (concerning
a RICO claim against abortion protestors where protestors conceded conduct was

criminal); Planned Parenthood of the Colombia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2637 (2003) (noting RICO
and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances ("FACE") claims against protesters);

Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting the addition of a RICO claim
against abortion protesters by plaintiffs); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1995)
(concerning a RICO action based on abortion protests).
6. See Xavier Beltran, Applying RICO to Eco-Activism: Fanning the Radical Flames
of Eco-Terror,29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 281,281-82 (2002).

7.
8.
9.
10.

See Parker, supra note 1, at 820-21.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
§ 1951. The Hobbs Act was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in United

1240

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."12
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,13 the
United States Supreme Court considered a civil RICO action against
abortion protesters.14 Petitioners, abortion protesters, aimed to shut
down abortion clinics and convince women not to have abortions. 5
In the statutory language, they attempted to achieve these goals
through the use of "force, violence, or fear."16
To prevail on the civil RICO claim, the plaintiff in Scheidler
needed to demonstrate that the actions of the protesters met each
element of the predicate offense of Hobbs Act extortion. In the
abortion protest context, this would have required a broad
interpretation of the critical terms of § 1951(b)(2). 17 However,
Scheidler established a narrow, rather than broad, interpretation of
the critical term "obtaining."" The narrow interpretation requires
the extortionist to deprive the victim of property and acquire
States v. Local 807 Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942). James Lindgren, The
Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs
Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 889 (1988). The Hobbs Act's predecessor, the AntiRacketeering Act, was interpreted in Local 807 as inapplicable in cases where the
extortionists were seeking "wages." See id. Congress was "outraged" at the result of the
decision and replaced the Anti-Racketeering Act with the Hobbs Act to eliminate the
exception. See id.
11. Parker, supra note 1, at 820. The racketeering activities defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) function as the heart of RICO claims. See id. They are commonly referred to as
the predicate offenses. Id. Liability extends only if plaintiff can prove a pattern based on
a predicate offense. Id.
12. § 1951(b)(2).
13. 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
14. Id. at 393.
15. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994), rev'd, 537 U.S.
393 (2003). National Organizationfor Women, Inc. was the first time these parties met
before the Supreme Court.
16. See § 1951(b)(2); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 510 U.S. at 253. The tactics of
aggressive abortion protesters have often included torching, bombing, or vandalizing
clinics. Nona LaPlante, Clinic Blockades: What is the Problem? What is the Harm? What
is the Solution?, 3 CIRCLES: BuFF. WOMEN'S J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 15, 20 (1995).
17. See generally Parker, supra note 1, at 820-30 (discussing the critical elements of
the Hobbs Act). "Obtaining" and "property" are two critical terms in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2) that must be read broadly to apply the Hobbs Act in the abortion protest
context. See § 1951(b)(2).
18. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404. The description of the competing interpretations
("narrow" and "broad") used in this Recent Development is based on the amount of
activity theoretically covered by the adoption of each term. The "narrow" interpretation
would restrict the activity covered by the Hobbs Act by requiring the plaintiff to prove
two elements. The "broad" interpretation would allow the Hobbs Act to be applied to a
greater spectrum of activity by requiring only one element.
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property from the victim. 9 The broad interpretation would require
only deprivation. ° Under the narrow interpretation of "obtaining,"
the Hobbs Act does not cover the traditional actions 21 of abortion
protesters. 2
The majority based its narrow interpretation of
"obtaining" on three rationales: (1) Congress adopted the common
law meaning of "obtaining" when it enacted the Hobbs Act,23 (2) a
1973 Supreme Court decision supported the narrow definition,2 4 and
(3) to define "obtaining" as only requiring deprivation would collapse
the difference between coercion and extortion and run contrary to
congressional intent.
Scheidler will have a significant impact on the use of RICO
against abortion protesters. The greater impact, however, will likely
be on the general application of RICO. As opposed to recent
decisions, which fueled expansion,26 the Scheidler Court's adoption of
the narrow definition of "obtaining" will likely slow the expansion of
RICO. Plaintiffs and prosecutors will no longer be able to cite Hobbs
Act extortion as the predicate offense against protesters.
Accordingly, it will be difficult to apply RICO within the protest
context.2
This Recent Development examines Scheidler as a
departure from the trend of expanding civil RICO. It analyzes each
rationale underlying the Court's decision and finds two of the three
persuasive. In addition, it argues that the position offered by the
dissent is not convincing. Finally, it proposes an alternate rationale in
support of the Court's holding.
A familiarity with the basic facts of Scheidler is necessary in
order to understand the fundamental difference between the
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
22. See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 409. The fact pattern in Scheidler is consistent with the
traditional abortion protest fact pattern. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
After applying the narrow definition of "obtaining," the Court held "[b]ecause we find
that petitioners did not obtain or attempt to obtain property from respondents, we
conclude that there was no basis upon which to find that they committed extortion under
the Hobbs Act." Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 409. The decision to narrowly interpret
"obtaining," therefore, prevents application of the Hobbs Act in the traditional abortion
protest context.
23. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 402-04.
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id. at 405-08.
26. See Parker, supra note 1, at 830 (arguing that recent interpretations of Hobbs Act
terms have greatly expanded the application of RICO); Id. at 838 (arguing that recent
interpretations of RICO terms have greatly expanded the application of RICO).
27. See Beltran, supra note 6, at 297-98 (arguing that the Hobbs Act could, under preScheidler case law, be used to hold protesters liable).
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rationales of the majority and dissenting opinions. Simply put, it is
important to note which facts are present and which facts are not.
The facts that traditionally appear in aggressive abortion protests are
present. The protesters aimed to force the clinics to close and
convince women not to have abortions. 28 As described by the
Seventh Circuit:
[T]he protest missions also involve illegal conduct:
protesters do everything from sitting or lying in clinic
doorways and waiting to be arrested to engaging in more
egregious conduct such as entering the clinics and destroying
medical equipment and chaining their bodies to operating
tables to prevent the tables from being used. In a few
instances, protesters apparently have physically assaulted
clinic staff and patients.
In addition to staging these
protests, the defendants have issued letters and statements
to other clinics threatening to stage missions at those clinics
unless they voluntarily shut down.29
Absent, however, is the physical transfer of property between the
parties,3" a traditional aspect of an extortion case.3 The absence of a
physical transfer of property marks the difference between situations
characterized as mere deprivation and situations involving both
acquisition and deprivation.
In addition to a basic grasp of the facts, an understanding of how
Scheidler fits into the overall debate concerning RICO expansion is
essential to appreciating the nature and significance of the decision.
RICO was initially designed to combat organized crime.32 To prevail
on a RICO claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the defendant,

28. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994), rev'd, 537 U.S.
393 (2003).
29. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2001) (using
the term "protest missions" as a neutral description of the protestors' actions), rev'd, 537
U.S. 393 (2003).
30. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 510 U.S. at 253-54.
31. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290 (1969) (agreeing with appellant
that acts "generically classified as extortionate" include "obtaining something of value
from another"); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 595 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(finding that "[a]t common law, extortion was defined as 'any officer's unlawfully taking,
by color of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not due to him' "
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141 (emphasis added))); Peter J.
Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793, 846-50 (2001)

(discussing the requirement of payment to the extortionist).
32. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1967 (2000)); Daniel Luccaro et al.,
Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations,38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2001).
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through the commission of two or more acts constituting a pattern of
racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invested in, maintained an
interest in, or participated in, an enterprise, the activities of which
The underlying
affected interstate or foreign commerce. '3 3
racketeering activity is generally referred to as the predicate offense.3 4
As mentioned above, RICO expansion is directly related to both the
breadth of its predicate offenses and the interpretation of its own
statutory language. 35 The predicate offense most often applied to
protesters is violation of the Hobbs Act.36
The interpretation of "property" used in the Hobbs Act offers an
example of a term given a broad reading.37 Courts have read
''property" to include not only the traditional conception of property,
but also intangible property and rights that more closely resemble
traditional civil rights.38 This interpretation is moving toward its
maximum breadth.39 The breadth of the Hobbs Act increases as its
terms are broadly interpreted.
Courts also interpret the enterprise requirement of RICO
According to one commentator, courts read the
broadly.4 °
requirement "in its absolute broadest manner."'" Courts interpret it
in such a way as to cover almost any organized group working toward
a common purpose. 42 RICO becomes applicable in more situations as
its statutory language is broadly interpreted and the breadth of its
predicate offenses increases.
Scheidler concerns a term from one of the predicate offenses:

33. Luccaro, et al., supra note 32, at 1215.
34. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 1, at 820 (noting that the criminal statutes
referenced by RICO are collectively known as the predicate offenses).
35. Parker, supra note 1, at 820-21.
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id. The Hobbs Act mentions "property" in the context of extortion: "the
obtaining of property from another." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2000). It is important to
appreciate the distinction between "property" and "obtaining." "Property" is offered here
only as an example of a Hobbs Act term. It is not offered as a substitute for, or as any part
of the analysis of, "obtaining." Below, this Recent Development discusses the broad
definition of "property" in the context of the Scheidler dissent. See infra notes 109-20 and
accompanying text. The example here is wholly separate from the later discussion.
38. Parker, supra note 1, at 820 (describing the right to democratically participate in a
labor union as falling within the category of traditional civil rights).
39. See id. at 830.
40. Id. at 838.
41. Id.; see also Beltran, supra note 6, at 297 (discussing the broad interpretation of
the enterprise requirement and its application in the environmental setting). For a general
discussion of RICO terms, see Artie Jones et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations,39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 977, 983-95 (2002).
42. See Parker, supra note 1, at 836-38.
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"obtaining" as used in Hobbs Act extortion.43 The breadth of the
Hobbs Act extortion provision-and with it, the applicability of
RICO-depends on whether "obtaining" is interpreted broadly to
require only deprivation or narrowly to require both deprivation and
acquisition. 44 The broad interpretation increases the applicability of
RICO by requiring a plaintiff to prove only one element, while the
narrow interpretation restricts its reach by requiring a plaintiff to
prove two.
The Court slowed the expansion of RICO by adopting the
narrow definition of "obtaining.""
The majority employed three
rationales to support its holding. First, the Court found that Congress
adopted the common law meaning of extortion when it enacted the
Hobbs Act.46 The pre-Hobbs Act common law definition included
the requirement that property must be "obtained."47 Precedent cited
by the Court indicated this "obtaining" requirement included both
deprivation and acquisition.48
The Court therefore interpreted
"obtaining" to require both elements.49
Second, the majority cited United States v. Enmons, ° a 1973
decision supporting the narrow definition. 1 The Scheidler Court
determined that the Court in Enmons read the extortion provision of
the Hobbs Act as requiring acquisition in addition to deprivation.5 2
This settled the definition for the purposes of Scheidler.53
Finally, the Court found that to define "obtaining" as only
requiring deprivation would collapse the difference between coercion
and extortion.54 Coercion, the majority determined, entails the use of
force to limit another's "freedom of action," whereas extortion
requires the extortionist to receive property from the victim.5 The
Court found removing the acquisition requirement would leave the
two crimes practically identical and allow coercion to be included
43. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003) (finding for
petitioners because they did not "obtain" property).
44. See Parker, supra note 1, at 827.
45. Scheidler,537 U.S. at 404.
46. Id. at 402.
47. Id. at 402-03.
48. Id. at 403 (citing People v. Ryan, 133 N.E. 572, 573 (N.Y. 1921), and People v.
Weinseimer, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)).
49. See id. at 404.
50. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
51. Scheidler,537 U.S. at 404.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 405.
55. See id. at 405-06.
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under the Hobbs Act.56

Because Congress intentionally included

extortion and excluded coercion when the Hobbs Act was passed, the
Court interpreted "obtaining" narrowly to preserve congressional
intent.57

Analysis of the Court's reasoning demonstrates that the holding
is correct. Satisfying the "obtaining" element in Hobbs Act extortion
cases requires an acquisition and deprivation5 8 of property, not simply

a deprivation. The Court's first rationale-the Hobbs Act uses the
common law definition of extortion, which requires acquisition-and
the third rationale-adopting the broad definition would collapse the
difference between extortion and coercion, and would therefore be

contrary to congressional intent-are persuasive.

However, the

second rationale-Enmons already defined "obtaining"-is not.
The first rationale convincingly uses an established method of

statutory interpretation to define "obtaining."

A court presumes a

statutory term has its common law meaning unless Congress has
provided other direction.5 9 Because Congress provided no direction

concerning the specific interpretation of "obtaining,"'6 the Court
correctly adopted the common law definition.
Furthermore, congressional endorsement of the common law

definition of extortion supports the adoption of the common law
definition of "obtaining." In Evans v. United States,6 the Court
determined that the Hobbs Act extended the common law definition
of extortion. 62 In Evans, an elected official accepted money from an
undercover FBI agent posing as a real estate developer. 63 The money
was accepted with the understanding that it was offered in exchange
56. See id. at 405-08.
57. Id. at 407-08. For a discussion of the congressional consideration, see infra notes
60-69 and accompanying text.
58. The acquisition of property by the extortionist implies depriving the victim of
property. Therefore, as used in the analytical section of this Recent Development,
"acquisition" represents both deprivation and acquisition.
59. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990) (observing the "maxim that a
statutory term is generally presumed to have the common-law meaning"); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (finding that Congress presumably "knows and
adopts" the ideas associated with the common law definition of a statutory term and that
courts should interpret the term in line with the common law definition unless otherwise
directed by Congress).
60. See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 402-08 (discussing Hobbs Act's congressional history
and failing to directly cite a reference to "obtain"); United States v. Culbert 435 U.S. 371,
376-80 (1978) (discussing Hobbs Act congressional debate and failing to directly cite a
reference to "obtain").
61. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
62. Id. at 261.
63. Id. at 257.
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for the public official's support of an effort to rezone a tract of land,
an exercise of his official power.' The expansion of the common law
definition referenced in Evans concerned broadening extortion to
cover "acts by
private individuals. ' 65 It did not alter the definition of
"obtaining. '66 In formulating the Hobbs Act, Congress adopted the
common law definition of extortion and expanded it to cover private
acts, but left its essential elements, including the common law
understanding of "obtaining," untouched.
After adopting the common law definition, the Scheidler Court
properly determined that "obtaining," as defined at common law,
required acquisition. Congress used the Penal Code of New York
and the Field Code, a nineteenth century model code, in crafting the
Hobbs Act. 67 As defined in New York before passage of the Hobbs
Act, "obtaining" required acquisition as well as deprivation.68
Congress adopted the narrow common law definition, and the narrow
definition is therefore applicable in Scheidler.
The Scheidler Court's third rationale also employs an established
method of statutory construction-examining congressional intent.
Adopting the broad definition of "obtaining"-which finds
deprivation alone to be sufficient-would collapse the distinction
between coercion and extortion that existed when Congress enacted
the Hobbs Act. Extortion, as defined in New York when Congress
adopted the New York provision as part of the Hobbs Act, required
acquisition of property. 69 However, coercion under New York law
did not include acquisition as an element, but contained every other
element of extortion.7"
Accordingly, removing the acquisition
64. See id.
65. Id. at 261; see Lindgren, supra note 10, at 889-90 (noting "Congress chose a
standard definition of extortion" when formulating the Hobbs Act).
66. Evans, 504 U.S. at 261-62 (finding that essential aspects of the common law
extortion definition were maintained for purposes of the Hobbs Act).
67. Id. at 262 n.9. But see Lindgren, supra note 10, at 889-92 (arguing that the degree
to which Congress relied on the New York statute when formulating the Hobbs Act has
been overstated).

68. 4 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, PROPOSED PENAL CODE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 584 note, at 210 (Proposed Draft 1865) (reprint 1998)
[hereinafter FIELD CODE] (using "expressly" to require acquisition). Furthermore, case
law following the Field Code interpreted "obtaining" narrowly. See People v. Ryan, 133
N.E. 572, 573 (N.Y. 1921) (recognizing that extortion requires acquisition); People v.
Weinseimer, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 588 (1907) (finding that "the material issue [in an extortion
prosecution] was not whose money was it, but did the defendant receive it from the
complainant").
69. See Ryan, 133 N.E. at 572 (equating "to extort" with to "gain any money or other

property").
70. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405-06 (2003)
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requirement from extortion by adopting the broad definition of

"obtaining" leaves only coercion.
The collapse of the two definitions is contrary to congressional

intent. Congress intended the Hobbs Act to include extortion and

exclude coercion. The predecessor to the Hobbs Act was the AntiRacketeering Act.7'
The Anti-Racketeering Act included both
extortion and coercion.72
After deliberate revision, Congress
replaced the Anti-Racketeering Act with the Hobbs Act,73 which did

not maintain the specific reference to coercion, but did maintain the
reference to extortion.74
In light of the careful consideration
Congress gave to the reformation of the law, it is safe to conclude that

Congress did not intend to include coercion. Applying the broad
definition of "obtaining," requiring only deprivation, would allow
prosecutors and plaintiffs to label what is actually coercion as
extortion and expand the reach of the Hobbs Act further than
Congress intended. The Court therefore had to adopt the narrow

definition to preserve congressional intent.
While the first and the third rationales offered by the Court are
persuasive, the second is not. The Court, in only one paragraph that
directly cited only one opinion, declared that Enmons had settled the
definition of "obtaining. '75 In Enmons, the Court used the term
"taking" while referring to extortion.76 The case involved striking
utility workers who used violent acts, such as shooting company

transformers and blowing up a company transformer substation, to
obtain higher wages and other benefits.77 The question addressed by
(distinguishing extortion and coercion based on the lack of acquisition as an element of
coercion).
71. Evans, 504 U.S. at 261; Parker, supra note 1, at 823.
72. The Anti-Racketeering Act did not specifically prohibit extortion and coercion by
name, but its language is equivalent to the common law definition. Anti-Racketeering
Act, ch. 569, §§ 2(a)-(b), 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000))
(prohibiting acts equivalent to coercion in § 2(a) and acts equivalent to extortion in
§ 2(b)). The Scheidler Court explicitly recognized the equivalence of the AntiRacketeering Act language and the common law definition of extortion and coercion.
Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 406-07.
73. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 378 (1978) (observing that "many
Congressmen praised the bill because it set out with more precision the conduct that was
being made criminal"); Parker, supra note 1, at 822-24 (describing the passage of the
Hobbs Act as a response to a particular United States Supreme Court decision).
74. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000) (containing no reference to coercion);
Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 407 (discussing the creation of the Hobbs Act and demonstrating the
inclusion of extortion and the exclusion of coercion).
75. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404.
76. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,399-400 (1973).
77. Id. at 398.
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the Court was whether the Hobbs Act applied to acts of violence used
during a legal strike for the purpose of achieving legitimate collectivebargaining demands.78
The Scheidler Court found the consideration of "taking" in
Enmons sufficient
to conclusively settle the definition of
"obtaining." 9 There are two reasons why this conclusion is incorrect.
First, "obtaining" was not interpreted in Enmons. Enmons mentions
"taking" in a sentence intended to interpret the term "wrongful.""0
The Scheidler Court rests the current interpretation of "obtaining" on
this previous mention of "taking." Its conclusion is not persuasive.
Second, the majority opinion fails to sufficiently address other
possible interpretations of "obtaining."
While this Recent
Development will later argue that the broad interpretation of
"obtaining" does not enjoy the widespread judicial support
referenced in the dissent, there is at least one case, United States v.
1
Arena,"
that directly interprets "obtaining" in a broad fashion,
requiring only deprivation.8 2 The Court relegates its assessment of
Arena to the footnotes of its opinion 3 instead of addressing it
thoroughly.
A court could read the Enmons interpretation of "taking" to
support the holding in Scheidler. The Court's argument, if not directly
stated, is that "obtaining" and "taking" can be used interchangeably
in the extortion context.
Therefore, the Enmons opinion, by
implicitly adopting the traditional understanding of "taking"requiring both deprivation and acquisition-could be cited as support
for the broad "obtaining" definition.'
Nevertheless, to find the definition of "obtaining" conclusively
settled based on Enmons, and without thoroughly addressing Arena,
78. Id. at 399.
79. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404.
80. See Enmons, 410 U.S. at 400. Even though it is the only case the Scheidler Court
references, the Court does not directly cite Enmons. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404 (using
"See" to signal that the line in the Enmons decision on which the Scheidler Court relies
does not directly state the proposition it claims).
81. 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 394. There are other cases that provide strong support for the broad
interpretation of "obtaining," but do not specifically address the direct interpretation.
E.g., Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 438 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the blockading
tactics of abortion protesters constitute extortion); United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358,
364 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that the extortionist did not have to intend to receive the funds
demanded and the defendant would have been guilty of violating § 1951 if "he had simply
demanded that [the victim] burn [the money]").
83. See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 403-04 n.8.
84. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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is erroneous. The Court's second rationale, therefore, does not
support defining "obtaining" narrowly.
Regardless, the Court's holding is correct. Even if the second
rationale fails, the first and the third sufficiently demonstrate that
"obtaining," in the context of the Hobbs Act, requires both
acquisition and deprivation.
The Court was not unanimous in its judgment that "obtaining"
requires both deprivation and acquisition. Justice Stevens, the lone
dissenter in Scheidler, argued the Court should have interpreted the
term broadly to require only deprivation.8 5 His argument relied on
three fundamental propositions:
(1) "obtaining," properly
interpreted, requires only deprivation; (2) courts have uniformly
applied the broad interpretation throughout the country; and (3) a
consistently relied upon, uniform interpretation should remain law
until Congress changes it.86 While seemingly straightforward, the
dissenting opinion is not persuasive. Justice Stevens's arguments
supporting his first two propositions fail. His third conclusion could
be considered convincing, but it is not persuasively supported in the
text.
Each of Justice Stevens's propositions relies on the next for
justification. If the second proposition-a universal interpretation
exists-is true, it is only persuasive if the third proposition-a
universal interpretation should be adopted unless Congress alters itis true. In the same way, the persuasiveness of the first proposition"obtaining" requires only deprivation-relies on the truth of the
second proposition. Accordingly, the most efficient way to consider
the dissenting opinion is to address the argument in reverse order. In
the third proposition, Justice Stevens argued the uniform
interpretation of the Hobbs Act that has prevailed for decades should
remain "unless and until" Congress decides to alter the statute.87 His
conclusion, in general, could be considered persuasive,88 but he failed
85. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 412-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the "obtaining" requirement can be met
by forcing a victim to surrender control and adopting the broad Arena interpretation of
"obtaining").
87. Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Justice Stevens has argued this point in many opinions. See Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a settled construction
of an important statute should not be disturbed until Congress decides to do so);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that the uniform and consistent decisions reached by the Court of
Appeals in interpreting the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act's status
requirement has created a reasonably clear rule of law that should be respected); McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376-77 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that a long-
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to support the argument with convincing authority, citing only four
opinions, none of which were majority opinions.
Justice Stevens, however, failed to establish the second
proposition of his opinion, that there exists a generally agreed-upon
definition of "obtaining." "[F]ederal courts in virtually every circuit"
have not cited with approval the broad interpretation of "obtaining,"
as Justice Stevens claims.9" He attempted to demonstrate widespread
adoption by citing United States v. Tropiano,9 1 United States v.
Provenzano,' United States v. Green,93 United States v. Hathaway,94
Libertad v. Welch,95 United States v. Lewis,9 6 and United States v.
Arena,97 among others.98 For these cases to support Justice Stevens's
argument, each must support the broad definition of "obtaining."
Lewis,9 9 Arena,' and Libertad0 ' required only deprivation and
support his claim. In Lewis, the defendant claimed responsibility for
the Tylenol poisoning crisis of 1982.102 The Seventh Circuit found
acquisition of property unnecessary, holding "loss to the victim is the
standing, consistent interpretation of a federal statute should not be rejected unless
Congress clearly intends such a result); Comm'r v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 101 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating the strong "general interest in ensuring that the responsibility for
making changes in settled law rests squarely on the shoulders of Congress"). Justice
Stevens gives great weight to the reliance of the public on a long-standing interpretation of
a statute-one significant point in support of judicial deference to Congress. This Recent
Development addresses neither the issue of whether the judicial branch should ever defer
to Congress on matters of interpretation, nor the issue, if deference is appropriate, of how
long an interpretation must exist before Justice Stevens's envisioned deference is
triggered.
89. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Schiedler, 537 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argues there is
widespread acceptance of the broad definition of "obtaining property." Id. There is
consensus on the definition of "property." See Parker, supra note 1, at 826-27. However,
from this one cannot draw a consensus interpretation of the term "obtaining" or the
phrase "obtaining property."
91. 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969).
92. 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964).
93. 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
94. 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1976).
95. 53 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1995).
96. 797 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
98. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 413-16 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
99. See Lewis, 797 F.2d at 364 (stating that the defendant would have been guilty of
violating § 1951 if "he had simply demanded that [the victim] burn [the money]").
100. Arena, 180 F.3d at 394. For the facts of Arena, see infra notes 104-05 and
accompanying text.
101. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 438 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding the blockading
tactics of abortion protesters constitute extortion).
102. Lewis, 797 F.2d at 362-63.
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gravamen of the offense.' ' . 3 Arena concerned attacks on abortion
clinics in which one defendant secretly poured butyric acid in
clinics."° The acid produced a powerful odor and forced the clinics to
close.0 5 The Second Circuit found that an extortionist may "obtain"
property even if she receives nothing from the victim.106 The court in
Libertad considered five separate abortion protests where protesters
forced clinics to close by physically obstructing the entrances, issuing
death threats and harassing patients. 7 The First Circuit found it
"difficult to conceive" facts that better demonstrate extortion than
preventing plaintiffs from "conducting ...lawful activities."' 0 8
The other four cases cited in the dissent, however, do not support
Justice Stevens's argument. Rather, they focus on the definition of
"property" rather than "obtaining." In Tropiano, the main case
referenced in the dissent, the defendants, through threats of violence,
prevented the victim from operating his business in competition with
the defendants. 9 Tropiano recognized that intangible goods, such as
the right to solicit business, constitute "property."' 0
Hathaway
concerned public officials extorting money in exchange for public
contracts"' ' and simply endorsed the Tropiano interpretation of
"property."" Neither opinion directly supports a broad definition of
"obtaining," and therefore neither supports the dissent's claim that
there is a widely adopted definition.
Provenzano, cited in both Tropiano and the Scheidler dissent for
its support of a broad property definition, held only that the alleged
extortionist does not necessarily have to receive a "benefit" from the
extortion." 3 The court in Provenzano considered a situation where
103. See id. at 364.
104. Arena, 180 F.3d at 386-88.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 394.
107. Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1995).
108. Id. at 438 n.6.
109. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1074 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[the victim's]
agreement to surrender this plan was due to fear for himself and his family").
110. Id. at 1076.
111. United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386,389-90 (1st Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 396 (citing Tropiano,418 F.2d at 1076).
113. United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir. 1964). Provenzano has
three possible interpretations. In the light most favorable to the dissent, "benefit" and
"property" represent the same idea and Provenzano can be used as support. Provenzano
can also be read to leave the "benefit"-"property" relationship ambiguous because the
opinion does not directly discuss the transfer of property. Finally, it can be read to
support a narrow definition of "obtaining." Defendants' representative received money
from the victim. See id. Considering the defendant and its representative as one legal
entity allows one to find support for the narrow definition.
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union officials were convicted of extorting money from a local
business owner.11 4 The Supreme Court considered a similar situation
in Green, where a local union and its officials were convicted of using
threats of force to extort unnecessary wages from a local business.'1 16
In Green, the extorting parties acquired money from the victim.
Green also held acquisition of a "benefit" unnecessary for an
extortion conviction. 17
This indicates that the Green Court
considered the situation to be one in which extortionists could acquire
"property" (money), but no "benefit." Therefore, Green established
a theoretical separation between "property" and "benefit." '1 8
Provenzano, by citing Green, adopted this theory." 9
Because
114. Id. at 680.
115. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 417 (1956). Consideration of Hobbs Act
extortion within the labor context not only raises questions concerning Justice Stevens's
interpretation of "obtaining," it raises the question of whether the Hobbs Act is applicable
to abortion protesters under any circumstances. The Court in Enmons found the Hobbs
Act inapplicable when defendants were pursuing "legitimate labor ends." United States v.
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401 (1973) (finding "[tihe legislative framework ...dispels any
ambiguity.., and makes it clear that the [Hobbs] Act does not apply to the use of force to
achieve legitimate labor ends").
The distinction between Enmons and Green is important. In Enmons the striking
workers were seeking a legitimate increase in wages. Id. at 398. In Green, an example of a
labor case in which the Hobbs Act was applied, the wages were for superfluous and
fictitious services. Green, 350 U.S. at 417.
The "ends" of abortion protesters are subject to interpretation. If framed as to
convince patients not to seek and doctors not to perform abortions or to close clinics, the
"ends" are probably legitimate. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,
253 (1994), rev'd, 537 U.S. 393 (noting that the aim of the protesters was to shut down
abortion clinics and persuade women not to have abortions). It is only the means that are
objectionable. Given the legitimate goals of the protesters, a broad reading of the holding
in Enmons may require ruling abortion protesters entirely out of the reach of RICO.
116. Green, 350 U.S. at 417 ("[A]ttempts to obtain from the ... employer 'his money,
in the form of wages' " (quoting the indictment)).
117. Id. at 420 ("[E]xtortion ...in no way depends upon having a direct benefit
conferred on the person who obtains the property").
118. While Justice Stevens cites Green, a case in which "property" and "benefit" are
separated, courts have not always followed or clearly marked this separation. See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 684-87 (2d Cir. 1984) (using the terms "property"
and "benefit(s)" interchangeably in reference to "forty fully paid trips to various resorts
throughout the country, two 'all events' season tickets to Madison Square Garden,
countless rounds of free golf, meals and other benefits, altogether worth in excess of
$34,000").
119. Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 685-86. The Third Circuit's support for the division of
"property" and "benefit" is also directly demonstrated in Provenzano. The majority held
"it is not necessary to prove that the extortioner himself, directly or indirectly, received
the fruits of his extortion or any benefit therefrom." Id. at 686. The court separates the
"fruits" from the "benefits." Initially, this finding may also seem to indicate support for
Justice Stevens's position that acquisition is unnecessary. However, the court immediately
also found "it is enough that payments were made at the extortioner's direction to a
person named by him." Id. Provenzano requires acquisition, just not a direct transfer to
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"property" and "benefit" can be theoretically separated, authorities
finding acquisition of a "benefit" unnecessary for extortion do not
directly support finding acquisition of "property" unnecessary. The
dissent depends on this missing connection. Analysis of "benefit"
acquisition must be de facto analysis of "property" acquisition for
Green and Provenzano to endorse the broad interpretation of
"obtaining." Stated in a different way, if "benefit" and "property"
could not be separated, any authority finding acquisition of a
"benefit" an unnecessary element of extortion would also support
finding acquisition of "property" an unnecessary element. Because
this is not the case, Justice Stevens cannot accurately cite Green and
Provenzano as signals of his national consensus. Justice Stevens
cannot rely on any of these four cases to support his second
proposition. His claim that there is a national consensus on the
"commonsense" 120 interpretation of "obtaining" fails, therefore, for
two reasons:
(1) Tropiano and Hathaway addressed the
interpretation of "property" rather than "obtaining," and (2) the
theoretical technique used in Green and Provenzano eliminates their
applicability in Scheidler.
Finally, Justice Stevens supported his first proposition, that
courts should read "obtaining" to require only deprivation, with two
unconvincing arguments. Initially, he established a broad definition
of "property" by arguing this broad interpretation covers the
intangible property right of exclusive control of business assets. 21
Justice Stevens then made a troublesome leap. He argued that
forcing someone to surrender control of an intangible right-such as
the exclusive control of business assets-is "an appropriation of
control" of that intangible right. 122 Therefore, the party applying the
force obtains control of the right once the other party surrenders it.
Justice Stevens did not cite any authority for this claim 23 and
interpreted "obtaining" as if there were only one possible definition
due to the expanding "property" interpretation. Authority, in fact,
supports exactly the opposite-forcing a party to surrender control of
an intangible right is coercion, not extortion. 124 For example, in
the extortionist. See id.
120. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 412 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority does not disagree with this definition,
but insinuates Justice Stevens might expand it too far. See id. at 402.

122. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., People v. Kaplan, 240 A.D. 72, 76-77 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1934)

(demonstrating a situation in which defendants were convicted of coercion for forcing
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People v. Kaplan,25 members of a local union were convicted of
coercion for forcing other union members to drop a lawsuit. 126 In
other words, the victims were forced to surrender an intangible right.
By upholding the coercion convictions in Kaplan, the New York court
implied that acquisition was absent from the fact pattern. 2 7
Precedent, therefore, differs from, and does not support, Justice
Stevens's assessment, which reads acquisition into a similar fact
pattern.
Justice Stevens's second argument adopted the argument in
Arena.128 The Arena court cited two definitions from Webster's
Dictionary: "obtain" and "disposal.', 129 According to the dictionary
cited in Arena, "obtain" includes " 'attain[ing] ... disposal of.' ,130
"Disposal" means " 'the regulation of the fate ... of something.' ""'
The Arena court then combined these two definitions to interpret
"obtaining" as "to attain regulation of the fate of."'13 2 Adopting this
definition would require only deprivation. However, to adopt this as
the accurate interpretation, one would have to endorse it over the
"familiar" definition,'3 3 find it more persuasive than the majority's use
of the common law definition, and deny the applicability or substance
of the rule of lenity.134
The universal adoption of the Arena
victims to sacrifice an intangible right); People v. Podolsky, 496 N.Y.S.2d 619, 623-25
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding "the alleged intentional conduct of the defendants created an
atmosphere of coercion designed to deprive the tenants of their" contractual right of
possession).
125. 240 A.D. 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934).
126. Id. at 76.
127. Id. at 79-80 (affirming the coercion convictions). The difference between
coercion and extortion is acquisition. Extortion requires acquisition, while coercion does
not. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. By affirming the conviction, the court
implied that in a case where one party forces the other to sacrifice an intangible right,
acquisition is absent.
128. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 415-16 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999).
130. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1559 (1976)).
131. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 654 (1976)).
132. Id.
133. See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 403 n.8 (describing "to gain possession of" as a more
familiar definition than the definition cited in the dissent and Arena); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1078 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "obtain" as "[tjo get hold of by effort; to get
possession of; to procure; to acquire, in any way"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 996 (4th College ed. 1999) (defining "obtain" as "to get possession of by
some effort; procure").
134. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 403-04 n.8 (indicating that the rule of lenity is applicable).
The rule of lenity is a rule of statutory construction.
JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.04 (3d ed. 2001). It requires the interpretation of a
statute to be in favor of the defendant when the statute has multiple conflicting reasonable
interpretations. Id. In this instance, the rule would require the narrow definition (finding
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interpretation might justify rejecting the more accurate definitions,135
yet, as discussed above, there is no national consensus.' 36
Accordingly, the argument for the Arena definition is not convincing

and Justice Stevens's first proposition fails. The central argument of
the dissenting opinion, therefore, cannot withstand scrutiny.
Although the majority offers two compelling rationales to

support its narrow interpretation of "obtaining," there is an alternate
rationale that also supports the narrow definition. Previous opinions
concerning extortion "under color of official right" support the
'
narrow interpretation of "obtaining."137
Consequently, the narrow
interpretation was properly applied in Scheidler.
The Hobbs Act prohibits two types of extortion: coercive
'
extortion and extortion "under color of official right."138
The
distinction between the two is based on the means by which property
is "obtained."' 13 9 A coercive extortionist obtains property by force or
threat whereas an extortionist operating "under color of official

right" obtains property through the illegitimate use of public office.14 °
The Hobbs Act designates both means of extortion in the same
provision, § 1951(b)(2): "The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of

property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear or under color of official
right. ' 141 Both types of extortion under the Hobbs Act use the same
word: "obtaining." Therefore, the interpretation of "obtaining" as
used in reference to extortion "under color of official right" must be
the same as that used in reference to coercive extortion. To reach any

different conclusion requires the same word, used in the same statute,
to mean something different depending on the situation. This result
would run contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions.142
the Hobbs Act inapplicable). The narrow definition, requiring both acquisition and
deprivation, will prevent the application of the Hobbs Act in cases where the broad
definition would allow it. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 90-120 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (noting "the offense is
completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his
agreement to perform specific official acts").
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000); Lindgren, supra note 10, at 817.
139. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 817.
140. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 267 (1991) (summarizing the initial
separation of the two sorts of extortion and finding "[o]nly proof of the obtaining of
property under claims of official right was necessary [for a conviction]"); Lindgren, supra
note 10, at 817-18.
141. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added).
142. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) ("[Tlhere is a presumption that a
given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute... a presumption surely at
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The second type of Hobbs Act extortion, "under color of official
right," was considered by the Supreme Court in Evans and has been
considered by eleven circuits. 143 Evans and a substantial number of

appellate

opinions

reference

"acquisition

of property"

when

considering extortion "under color of official right."' 44 Scheidler
considered coercive extortion.1 45
Since the interpretation of

"obtaining" must be the same for both types of extortion, adoption of
the narrow interpretation is supported in this context.
The Scheidler Court interpreted "obtaining" to require the

extortionist to acquire property from the victim, not just deprive the
victim of property. Two of the three rationales employed by the
Court are compelling: the Hobbs Act references the common law
definition of extortion, which requires acquisition and deprivation;
and adopting the broad definition would be contrary to congressional
intent as it would collapse the difference between extortion and
coercion. The narrow definition adopted in Scheidler will slow, or
possibly end, the expansion of Hobbs Act extortion. This will make it
more difficult for prosecutors and plaintiffs to apply RICO to
its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence"); Atd. Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (finding "there is a natural
presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning" and the presumption is overcome only when the word is used in
"different parts of the act with different intent"). Interpretation of "obtaining" in the
Hobbs Act, therefore, would require an even greater presumption since the term is only
used once.
143. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258-59 (1992) (endorsing the view of nine
circuits regarding "passive acceptance" as a sufficient basis for a Hobbs Act violation and
noting the contrary opinion of two other circuits).
144. Id. at 265. Evans and decisions from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits discuss inducement as a requirement for extortion. See id. at 258-59,
259 n.2 (discussing the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding
inducement in the context of extortion and noting similar statements of law in other
circuits). There is no consensus concerning inducement; yet, both sides of the argument
reference the requirement of receipt by the extortionist. See, e.g., United States v. Evans,
910 F.2d 790, 796-97 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that extortion under color of official right is
proven when the "public official has accepted [property] in return for a requested exercise
of official powers"); United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that "[a]lthough receipt of benefits by a public official is a necessary element of the crime,
there must also be proof that the public official did something, under color of his public
office, to cause the giving of benefits"); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th
Cir. 1980) (reinstating an earlier judgment for conviction where defendant "received a
wrongful fee for himself"); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 123 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting defendant was convicted of extortion after "soliciting and receiving" property to
which he was not entitled); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 1980)
(noting defendant "concedes ... the sole motivation underlying his receipt of these ...

payments").
145. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994), rev'd, 537 U.S.
393 (2003).
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Within the abortion protest context, traditional

protesters will be protected from RICO actions. The decision will

make it more difficult to stretch RICO to cover environmental
protesters.1 47 Other protesters, such as anti-war demonstrators, are
also now less likely to be charged under RICO. 4 8 In short, when

commerce

alone has been disrupted, Scheidler prevents the

application of Hobbs Act extortion. Unless plaintiffs and prosecutors

can prove an attempt to actually acquire property from the victim, a
RICO conviction or award will not withstand appeal. Consequently,
the expansion of RICO application will also be decelerated.
ANDREW

H. NELSON

146. See Parker, supra note 1, at 844.
147. A parallel can be drawn between aggressive abortion protesters, such as those in
Scheidler, and environmental protesters resorting to "eco-sabotage." See Beltran, supra
note 6, at 282 (noting a pattern similar to the abortion protest context: "what was once
identifiable as direct action [environmental] protest is today blurring into highly
questionable protest tactics"). Some courts and commentators have supported applying
RICO to aggressive environmental protesters. Id.
148. The Hobbs Act "affects commerce" requirement also poses a large hurdle for
those prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).

